DIVERGING MALE WAGE INEQUALITY IN T H E UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1981-1988: D O INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN T H E DIFFERENCE?
J O H N DINARDO a n d THOMAS LEMIEUX* T h e U.S. and Canadian economies have much in common, including similar collective bargaining structures. During the period 1981-88, however, although both countries witnessed a decline in the percentage of workers belonging to unions and an increase in hourly wage inequality, those changes were much more pronounced in the United States than in Canada. Using data o n men in Canada a n d the United States in 1981 and 1988 (from the Labour Force Survey and supplements to the Current Population Survey), the authors study the effect of labor market institutions o n changes in wage inequality by computing simple counterfactuals such as the distribution of wages that would prevail if all workers were paid according to the observed nonunion wage schedule. Their results suggest that much more severe declines in the unionization rate in the United States than in Canada account for two-thirds of the differential growth in wage inequality between the two countries.
I
n a burgeoning literature, researchers have attempted to provide explanations for changes in the structure of wages, particularly in the United States.' A large increase in wage inequality in the United States in the 1980s has been so well documented by recent research that it has attained the rare status of a "fact" (Freeman and Katz 1994) . Education and age differentials increased, as well as wage dispersion within narrow d e m o g r a p h i c a n d skill groups.
T h e U.S. experience during the 1980s, though not unique, is not shared by all T h e data used in this paper are from the public use files of the May 1981 Current Population Survey (CPS), the 1981 and 1988 Outgoing Rotation Group Supple~nents of the CPS, the 1981 Canadian Survey of Work History, and the 1988 Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey. These data al-e publicly available. T h e computer programs used for data extraction a n d analysis are available upon request to the authors. Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1995) . O by Cornell University.
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0019-7939/97/5004 $01 . OO OECD countries for which detailed micro data are available. While the United Kingdom also saw dramatic increases in wage inequality during the 1980s, Japanese wage inequality grew only modestly, and French inequality grew even less (Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower 1995) .
Most of this research has a t t e m~t e d to explain changes in the wage structure by changes in the supply and demand for different skill categories of workers. O n the other hand, t h e r o l e of labor market institutions-in particular, the structure of collective bargaining agreements and the level of u n i o n i z a t i o n -h a s g o n e relatively unexamined. Recent research suggests, however, that between 10% and 20% of the increase in wage inequality among men in the United States and the United Kingdom " can be explained by the decline in unionization in these two countries.' There is also indirect evidence that cross-countrv differences in unionization play an important role in cross-country differences in the level of wage inequality.Vn addition, recent research by DiNardo, Fortin, a n d (henceforth DFL) suggests that another institution, the minimum wage, played a major role in the recent changes in U.S. wage inequality.
Using comparable micro data on men in the United States and Canada in 1981 and 1988 , in this paper we obtain direct evidence on how Eeiative chances in unioniza-" tion are linked to relative changes in the distribution of wages. We also look at the impact of the minimum wage on changes in wage inequality. ~x t e n d i nt echniques described in DFL and applying them in a "comparative" setting, we document the effect of these instititional forces on the 'For the United States, see Card (1992) ; DiNardo, Fortin, and I,e~nieux (1996); . For the United Kingdom, see Gosling and Machin (1995) .
"See Blau and Kahn (1996) a n d L e~n i e u x (1993). T h e latter found that differences between Canada and the United States in unionization rates explain 40% of the Canada/U.S. difference in wage inequality in 1986. entire distribution of wages instead of focusing on a few summary measures of wage inequality like the variance of log wages or the rate of return to education.
By comparing two countries at two points in time, we implicitly control for common underlying changes in wage inequality and for intrinsic differences in the level ofwage inequality in the two countries. O u r estimates, therefore, are less likely to reflect spurious correlations than estimates based either on cross-country comparisons at a point in time or on comparisons over time in a single country.
Micro Data o n Wages and Union Status
O u r analysis is based on data from supplements to the 1981 and 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS) in the United States, and from supplements to the 1981 and 1988 Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Canada. T h e CPS and the LFS are very similar surveys.
Since 1979, earnings information has been collected for one-quarter of individuals in the CPS. Large samples of about 90,000 men can thus be constructed from the "outgoing rotation groups files" of the CPS in both 1981 and 1988. O n e drawback of these samples, however, is that information on the union status of workers is only available after 1983. Fortunately, a question on union status was asked in the Multiple Job Holding and Premium Pay Supplement of the May 1981 CPS. We have therefore combined the May 1981 CPS data with the outgoing rotation group data to obtain comparable samples in both years.+ 'Note that the multipleJ Job HoldingandI'remiumPay Supplement was only administered to one-fourth of individuals in the >lay 1981 CPS. These individuals constitute roughly one-twelfth of the sample from the outgoing rotation group files. All the statistics that are computable even when union status is n o t available are thus calculated using the larger CPS sample. For example, the overall variance of log wages is always computed using the larger 1981 CPS sample, while the effect of unions 011wages is computed using the 1981 May CPS data only. In addition to the availability of union status information, these U.S. and Canadian samples have another advantage for studying changes in the structure of wages. Unlike the March CPS, the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances, or the census data for both countries, our s a m~l e s contain direct information on hourly or weekly wages and on usual hours of work on the main job. An hourly wage on the main job can thus be c o m~u t e d for each worker in our sample. This is a better measure of a point-of-time price of labor than the wage measures available in those other survey^.^ Our U.S. and Canadian s a m~l e s are not strictly comparable, however, since the earnings information is collected differently in and the 1988 LMAS are work history surveys that ask for usual earnings on u p to five jobs held during the previous year. We have therefore edited the Canadian s a m~l e s to obtain a sample of wages comparable to the samples in the CPS (see Appendix 1 for details).
T h e Canadian samples have other limitations compared to the CPS samples. First, only broad age and education categories are available in the public use versions of the 1981 SWH and 1988 LMAS. We have only four comparable education categories in the two countries, which is nevertheless satisfactory, since years of education in Canada and in the United States are not strictly comparable anyway.' T h e four education categories we use are primary education or less, some or completed high school, some college, and a university degree or more. In terms of years of schooling in the United States, these education categories correspond to 0-8 years, 9-1 2 years, 13-1 5 years, a n d 16 and more years, respectively. We also have six age categories (17-19, 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64) for our samples of men aged 17 to 64. Excluding university graduates aged 17 to 19, we can thus divide the data into 23 comparable age-education groups in the two countries.
Another limitation of the Canadian data is that there is n o earnings allocation flag in the public use samples. We thus keep allocated wage information in both U.S. and Canadian samples. This should have limited consequences for the analysis, since the two samples. Earnings in the ~~S ' a r e the U.S. Bureau of the Census and Statistics defined as usual (weekly o r hourly) earnings on the mainjob in the week previous to the survey date. By contrast, the 1981 SWH "ndividuals in the 1988 LMAS were followed up in 1989 . The 1989 samples are not strictly comparable to the 1988 sample, however, because of sample attrition.
"n fact, the hourly wage rate cannot be computed from the Survey of Consumer Finances or the Canadian census because of a timing problem. These data sources contain information on earnings and weeks worked during the previous year, but hours worked per week during the survey week. As summarized by Card and Freeman (1993) in avolume dedicated to examining the effect of "small differences" in the labor market institutions of the United States and Canada, the two countries have much in common: similar cultures, a similar standard of living, and similar economic institutions. U.S. citizens own a large share of Canadian business assets and vice-versa. Immigration between the two countries is substantial and the countries are each other's largest trading partners.
The two countries' highly decentralized collective bargaining systems are also similar. Since the 1930s Canadian institutions have followed changes in U.S. practices fairly closely, although U.S. labor history has typically been more violent. Union densities in the two countries tracked each RThe 1988 LMAS user guide mentioned that "two records with co~nputed total earnings f r o~n alljobs in excess of $150,000 have had their hourly wage rates reduced to valueswhich yield totals close to $150,000." gThe edited (and allocated) earnings variable is still top-coded at $999 in 1988, but an alternative unedited earningsvariable top-coded at $1,923 is also available. We use the unedited earnings variable for workers who report earnings from $999 to $1,923. For workers with missing earnings data, we impute the average wage of workers with non-missing earnings from $999 to $1,923. We also impute this wage to workers top-coded at $999 in 1981.
"The weights for Canada are actually these sample weights multiplied by our computed 'tjob" weights described in Appendix 1.
other until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when unionization began to decline in the United States while rising in Canada. Attitudes about unionization are fairly similar in the two countries (Riddell 1993) . Likewise, despite the higher levels of unionization in Canada, the sizes of U.S. and Canadian union wage differentials are similar, at least for men (Lemieux 1993) .
These important similarities between the two countries allow us to focus more sharply on the small differences between them. In particular, Freeman (1990) has argued that it is minor differences in labor laws that have led to the sharp divergence in the percentage of the work force that is unionized in the 1980s: U.S. unionization has fallen precipitously, whereas unionization rates in Canada have remained roughly constant. Perhaps not surprisingly, erdsion of the inflation-adjusted minimum wage was much greater in the United States than in Canada. Over the period 1981-88, the U.S. minimum fell 23%, while Canadian minimum wages fell only 12%.
The extent and pattern of unionization in the two countries are documented in detail in columns 3 and 4 (United States) and 7 and 8 (Canada) of Table 1. In the United States, union density declined by 7% (from 28% in 1981) . This decline is almost three times larger than the 2.4% " decline in unionization in Canada. The level of union membership is also much higher in Canada. The most striking difference is for those men with 9-12 years of school. In the United States in 1981, the unionization rate for this group was 33%; bv 1988 it had fallen to 26%. Bv contrast, the unionization rate for the same group of workers in Canada was 43% in 1981, and in 1988 it was still about 42%.
The unionization rate also decreased faster for younger workers than for older workers in the United States. Interestingly, the unionization rate declined almost as fast among young Canadians as it did among young Americans. So while the decline in U.S. unionism was more pronounced for young and less educated workers, the de--cline in Canada was solely concentrated among younger workers. There are also striking differences in ing, a n d construction toward serviceunionization rates by industry in the United based industries. States and Canada. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show that, in some industries, CaSupply, Demand, and nadian rates of unionization are as high as Overall Economic Performance 68% (Public Administration) o r 71%
(Education). Another difference is that A primary conclusion of the recent U.S. unionism uniformly declined in all U.S.
literature on widening wage inequality is industries except public administration.
that the decline in relative wages of lessSuch a systemic decline did not occur in skilled workers was driven by relative shifts Canada, although unionization shifted in labor demand. The two leading explanafrom traditional blue-collar industries tions for these shifts are skill-biased technisuch as natural resources, manufacturcal change and international trade. Other factors, such as changes in supply, have also been implicated. Before turning to institutional factors, we discuss possible similarities and differences between the two countries in demand and supply forces. Table 1 shows that the supply of workers by age and education categories changed at comparable rates in the United States (columns 1 and 2) and Canada (columns 5 and 6) during the 1980s. The age distributions of both countries were extremely similar. In both countries, the middle of the age distribution (ages 25-44) showed some growth over the period. The tails of the distribution (younger and older workers) showed significant declines in both countries.
In both countries, averace levels of u schooling increased, although U.S. men had more years of schooling on average. In particular, the proportion of men holding
. . a university degree increased by three per--centage points in both Canada (from 13% to 16%) and the United States (from 22% to 25%). O n the other hand, the supply of workers with a ~ost-secondary education but n o college degree increased faster in Canada (community colleges, CEGEPs in Quebec, one-or two-yea; certificates in universities) than in the United States. Overall, the supply of workers with more than a high school degree has thus increased fa;ter in Canadathan in the United States. The difference in supply shocks is even more pronounced in relative terms, since these workers represented a smaller fraction of the work fo-rce in Canada than in the United States in 1981. In a simple supply and demand setting, one would thus expect education wage differentials to decrease in Canada d a t i v e to the United States. Freeman and Needels (1993) indeed argued that supply factors account for half of the differential growth in education wage differentials in the two countries.
Turning to demand, columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the industrial distribution of employment in the United States and Canada in 1981 and 1988 . Given the difficulty of measuring directly the underlying demand shocks due to trade and technology, several authors-for example, Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) -have proxied these shocks using "fixed manpower requirement indices." The key variable in these demand indices is the change in employment by industry that induces different changes in the demand for different types of labor. Table 2 shows that the differences in the industrial distribution of employment between the countries are rather minor. The share of employment in natural resources and manufacturing industries decreased in both countries. That decline was offset by the growth of retail trade, business services, and personal and other services in both countries. Since the patterns of industrial restructuring are similar in the two countries, though more ~r o n o u n c e d in the United States. they are unlikely to play an important role in differential changes in wage inequality.
Alternative demand measures have been proposed by looking more directly at trade flows and technological innovation. For example, Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1996) compared relative demand shocks in the United States and Canada using changes in the import penetration rate and the utilization rate of personal computers. They found very similar patterns between the two countries in these two measures of demand. We conclude that changes in labor demand d o not play a major role in differential changes in wage inequality." Finally, it is worth noting that the two countries had similar overall economic performance. For instance, the employment/population ratios followed similar trends in the two countries." Likewise, as measured by growth in real GNP, the two countries were very similar. Although 1981 and 1988 both preceded major recessions, real GNP grew at an average annual rate of "In a previous version of this paper, we did try to assess the role of changes in supply and demand using the methodology of Bound and Johnson (1992) . We were unable to explain any systematic divergence in Canada/U.S. wage inequality using this approach.
12See Card and Riddell (1993) for a study of the relative employment performance of the two countries. Table 2 . Industrial Distribution of E m p l o y m e n t a n d Unionization i n t h e U n i t e d States a n d C a n a d a , 1981 a n d 1988. for the sake of comparison with other studies.
Changes in Summary
In the United States real hourly wages
Measures of Wage Inequality fell and income inequality increased by all
in the United States and Canada of our measures. In Canada, the increase in hourlv wage ineaualitv was more modest
Before looking at the effect of instituand real wages grew slightly. The standard tions on changes in wage inequality, it is deviation of log hourly wages in Canada useful to summarize these changes using grew by only 0.010 compared to 0.056 in c o m~a r a b l e data for the United States and the United States. The differential beCanada. In Table 3 wages grew half as fast in Canada (8.5%) as in the United States (16%). Interestingly, the greatest difference between the two countries seems to be at the top end of the distribution. Growth in the 10th-50th percentile differential was comparable in the two countries, while the 50th-90th percentile differential grew ten times faster in the United States than in Canada. Table 3 highlights the fact that in Canada hourly wage inequality grew much more slowly than weekly earnings inequality.13 For instance, the standard deviation of log weekly earnings increased by 0.054 while the standard deviation of hourly wages increased by only 0.010. Corresponding fig-" This fact was pointed out by Doiron and Barrett (1996) using the same data but differently constructed samples. They also reported similar findings for women in Canada.
ures for the United States are 0.074 and 0.056, respectively. Changes in weekly earnings inequality thus seem to be a good proxy for changes in inequality in the price of labor in the United States but not in Canada.I4 This suggests that weekly hours of work are more responsive than wages to changes in labor market conditions in "Using data from the Canadian Census and the Survey of Consumer Finances, authors such as Davis (1992) and Gottschalk and Joyce (1992) have found that weekly earnings inequality increased almost as fast in Canada as in the United States. We obtain similar results using the 1981 SWH and the 1988 LMAS but find that these results give little indication of changes in hourly wage inequality. Note that Picot, Myles, and Wannell (1990) also reported that data from the 1981 and 1986 Canadian censuses show a rate of growth in earnings inequality comparable to that found using data from the 1981 SWH and 1986 LMAS.
Canada, while the opposite is true in the United States. Identifying the source of this difference would be an interesting topic for future research.
Changes in the Overall
Density o f Wages
One drawback of summary measures of wage inequality is that they give little indication of what happens where in the distribution of wages. To get a more complete picture of the changes in the distribution of wages, we present kernel density estimates of the density of log wages in Figures Compared with the U.S. wage distribution, the Canadian wage distribution reported in Figure lb is much less skewed to the left and looks more log-normal. In addition, there is almost n o noticeable effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of wages in 1981. This may partly be explained by the large inter-province variation in the minimum wage in 1981: the minimum wage ranged from $3.00 in Ontario in the first months of 1981 to $4.00 in Quebec in the last months of 1981. By contrast, the minimum wage was the same in Ontario and Quebec in 1988 ($4.55 in the first six months of 1988, $4.75 later). This may explain why a concentration of "All estimates are obtained using a Gaussian kernel. After-some experimentation, we decided to use a bandwidth of 0.075 for all the samples. See DFL for more detail.
workers just above the minimum wage can be observed in 1988 but not in 1981. Note that this concentration of workers above the minimum wage in 1988 is the only substantial difference between two otherwise similar wage distributions.
Changes in Wage Inequality Between and Within Groups o f Workers
It is well known that both between-and within-group wage inequality increased in the United States in the 1980s. Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4 compare the changes in U.S. and Canadian between-group inequality by presenting a selected number of education and age wage differentials. Changes in within-group inequality are considered in row 3 by computing the standard deviation of log wages among the 23 age and education groups available.
First consider the results for all workers (union and nonunion) in columns 1 and 2. In Canada, the most striking source of increasing inequality is in the differential between older and younger men, especially at lower levels of schooling. The differential between men aged 45-54 and those aged 25-34 with 9-12 years of education increased by 13 percentage points over the period 1981-88. In the United States, however, the increased inequality seems to be more closely tied to incieases in returns to schooling. As is evident from rows 2a and 2b of Table 4 , education differentials grew more quickly in the United States than in Canada, where they remained roughly constant. In the United States, there was a 16 point increase in the college-high school differential (16 and more versus 9-1 2 years of education) for the 25-34 age group, and an 11 point increase for the 45-54 age group. As mentioned above, differences in supply are a natural explanation for the differential growth in education wage differentials in the two countries.
The changes in within-group standard deviations summarized in row 3 of Table 4 show that this measure of dispersion grew somewhat larger over the 1981-88 period in the United States and generally fell in Canada. When the between-and within- Min. Wage, 1988 145) ln (10) ln (15) ln ( 
In the United States, the story is just
We document changes in wage inequalthe opposite: wage differentials by age in ity among nonunion workers in columns 3 the nonunion sector grew by only 4 perand 4 of Table 4. Since nonunion workers centage points, while differentials byschoolare a majority in both countries, it is not ing grew dramatically. The college/high surprising that changes in the structure of school wage differential both for younger wages resemble the general patterns we workers and for older workers increased by observe for all workers. Some of these 20 percentage points.
patterns are more striking, however, for 3. Changes in within-group standard the nonunion sector:
deviations follow opposite patterns in the two countries. 1nLcanadi, within-group 1. In Canada, increases in wage inequalstandard deviations either changed little ity in the nonunion sector are mostly attribover the period or declined slightly. In the utable to a massive increase in wage differUnited States, they either increased or reentials by age, although there was also a mained approximately constant. small increase in the returns to education. The differential between workers aged 45-Some interesting differences emerge 54 and workers aged 25-34 with at least when we turn to the experience of union some high school increased by 11 percentworkers in the two countries (columns 5 age points over the period 1981 to 1988. and 6 ) . Among Canadian union workers, For workers with 16 and more years of education wage differentials and within-group standard deviations decreased substantially during the 1980s. On the other hand, the increase in age differentials in the union sector was almost as large as the increase in age differentials in the nonunion sector. In the United States, education wage differentials and the within-group standard deviation of log wages increased, albeit a bit more slowly than in the nonunion sector; age differentials increased faster in the union sector than they did in the nonunion sector. Except for age differentials, wage inequality thus increased faster in the nonunion sector than in the union sector in both Canada and the United States. This supports the view that inequality increased faster in the United States than in other industrialized countries because of the small size of its union sector. This hypothesis and others will be examined in more detail in the next section.
Effect of Unions and Minimum Wages on Changes in the Overall Wage Distribution
We now turn to the following question: What was the overall effect of unions on wage inequality in Canada and the United States? We look at this question in two ways.
First, for each country we ask the question: What would be the distribution of wages if union workers were paid according to the wage schedule prevailing in the nonunion sector? In other words, how would the wage distribution be different in the "absence of unions"? We develop a simple semiparametric procedure to answer this question.
Second, we repeat that comparison but focus on particular aspects of the distribution such as the variance of log wages and standard age and education wage differentials. This enables us to separate easily the effect of unions into between-and withingroup components.
We also look at the effect of another labor market institution, the minimum wage, on the distribution of wages. One reason we focus on the effects of unions and the minimum wage is that these two factors have clear and testable implications for both the mean and the variance of log wages (or other measures of inequality) for any given group of workers. The impact of unions on the variance is due the "leveling" effect of unions, while the impact of the minimum wage is due to the censoring of the lower tail of the wage distribution. By contrast, the standard supply and demand factors discussed above have implications only for the mean wages among age and education groups.
Semiparametric Estimates of the Union Effect on the Distribution of Wages
We use a simple semiparametric method to estimate the distribution of wages that would prevail if all workers were paid according to the observed nonunion wage schedule. Note that this is a more modest task than trying to estimate the distribution that would prevail in the absence of unions. The point is that the observed wage schedule in the nonunion sector may itself depend on the unionization rate because of general equilibrium effects (for example, nonunion companies pay workers more because of the threat of unionization) or selection biases (nonunion workers are a non-random sample of the population). For the sake of expositional brevity, however, we will occasionally use the shorthand "absence of unions" to refer to the state that would result if all workers were paid according to the observed nonunion wage schedule.
This semiparametric scheme is based on a simple reweighting of the distribution of wages of n o n u n i o n workers.
T h e unweighted distribution of wages in the nonunion sector is an inappropriate estimate of the distribution of wages in the absence of unions because the distribution of characteristics among nonunion workers is not the same as the distribution of characteristics among all (union and nonunion) workers. For example, blue-collar workers are underrepresented in the sample of nonunion workers. More "weight" has thus to be put on blue-collar workers in the nonunion sample to get the same propor-tion of blue-collar workers as in the overall sample. We describe the procedure in detail in Appendix 2.
Semiparametric estimates of the wage distribution that would prevail if all workers were paid according to the nonunion wage schedule are compared to the actual wage distribution in Figures 2 (United States) and 3 (Canada). The figures indicate qualitatively similar effects of unions on the distribution of wages. Unions tend to "move" workers from the middle-lower tail of the distribution to a peak slightly above the median of the distribution. This effect is most pronounced for Canadian workers in 1988 ( Figure 3b ) and least so for U.S. workers in 1988 (Figure 2b ). Not surprisingly, the figures indicate that unions have little effect on the distribution ofwages either near and below the minimum wage or in the upper tail of the distribution.
Returning to Figure la , a rough summary of the changes in the distribution of wages in the United States is that the decline in unionism leveled the peak slightly above the median of the distribution, while decreases in the minimum wage created a concentration of low-wage jobs at the bottom end of the distribution. Neither unions nor the minimum wage can explain, however, why the upper tail of the distribution became "fatter" in the United States.
The Effect of Unions on the Variance of Log Wages
We next focus on a specific measure of wage inequality, the variance of log wages. Unlike other measures of wage inequality, the variance can easily be decomposed into between-and within-group components, and into components attributable to unions, minimum wages, and so on.
As mentioned previously, the distribution of wages that would prevail if all workers were paid according to the nonunion wage schedule is obtained by weighting each observation i by a weighting factor 9, = 9(x1) (see Appendix 2 ) . Note that these weighting factors are normalized to have a mean of one. It is straightforward to incorporate standard CPS (or LFS) weights in this setting by multiplying them by 8,.
As shown in DFL, these weights can than be used to compute the density of wages or other statistics using standard estimation methods over the reweighted sample of nonunion workers. In what follows, we show how a modification of the procedure described in DFL can be used to decompose the effect of unions on the variance of log wages into several components of interest.'" Consider the variance of log wages for all workers and the variance for nonunion workers
The variance of log wages that would prevail if everybody were paid according to the nonunion wage schedule is simply where The estimated effect of unions on the variance of log wages is It is interesting to decompose the effect of unions into a wage compression effect between different groups of workers, a wage compression effect within groups of workers, and a wage gap effect. The decomposition is based on two standard wage equations, one for the union sector, another for the nonunion sector:
'"he decomposition is similar to the one in Freeman (1980) , although the reweighting procedure simplifies the computations. where Sis a n indicator whose value is Uif we are describing union wage-setting, and N if we are describing wage-setting in the nonunion sector. The vector Xi consists of a vector of observable characteristics such as dummy variables for the age and education categories, for part-time or full-time worker, for marital status, and for industry a n d occupation. T h e unobservable characteristics (or error terms) &:and &'rare assumed to have a zero conditional mean.
Using simple calculations, the union effect of equation (5) can be rewritten as the sum of three separate components. T h e wage compression effect between groups of workers is equal to This effect is typically believed to be negative because of the "leveling" effect of unions. In other words, unions tend to standardize wages by reducing the returns to various skills such as education (DL'< P,v).
Similarly, the wage compression effect of unions within groups of workers is equal to This effect is also typically believed to be negative because of the "leveling" effect. If the error term E, is interpreted as unobservable skills, the "leveling" effect simply means that unions reduce the returns to these unobservable skills. Finally, the wage gap effect is given by
where A is the difference in mean wages between the union and the nonunion sector and A is the union wage gap (for union workers) . I 7 Unlike the wage compression effects discussed above, this effect is typically believed to be positive. As stressed by "Formally, we have = .%'PL'-%"PV, where %'and are the sample averages of x,, in the-union and nonunion sectors, respectively, and A = X'(PL'-P.').
several authors (for example , Friedman 1962) , this effect is the consequence of the wage premium received by union workers. T h e point is that unions may increase inequality by advantaging some (union) workers at the expense of other (nonunion) workers. Table 5 presents the results of this decomposition for both countries in both years. We also add two numbers to the display to calculate the magnitude of the effect of unions. In columns 1 and 4 we present the actual components of variance that prevailed in the particular country and year. Next we recompute this component, applying the nonunion wage-setting equation to the distribution of union characteristics (both observed and unobserved). We label this "Variance Without Unions" and display the calculations in columns 2 and 5. Given the actual variance, and the variance without unions, the "Union Effect" reported in columns 3 and 6 is merely the difference between these two quantities. T h e union effect in rows 3,6, and 7 corresponds to the terms in equations ( 7 ) , (a),and ( 9 ) .
Note that before computing the effect of unions o n the variance ofwages, we control for changes in the real value of the minimum wage using a simple imputation procedure described in Appendix 2. T h e idea is to impute the part oi the 1981 distribution (in real terms) that lies at or below the 1981 minimum wage to workers earning this 1981 real minimum wage or less in 1988. This yields a simulated 1988 distribution that would have prevailed if the minimum wage had remained at its (higher) 1981 level.
As expected, in both countries and years, the union wage compression effects between and within groups of workers tend to reduce the overall variance of log wages. Also as expected, the wage gap effect is positive. This effect is small, however, because men with characteristics highly valued in the nonunion sector are less likely to be unionized in both countries (A is smaller than A).
T h e most interesting comparison between the two countries is how the equalizing influence of unions has changed over the period. Consider the wage compresfrom -.007 in 1981 to -.019 in 1988. Over sion effect of unions o n the variance bethe same period, the increase in this wage tween groups of workers in row 3 of both compression effect was much smaller in the panels. In Canada, this union effect grew United States (from -.008 in 1981 to -.009 in 1988) . Similarly, the wage compression effect of unions on the variance within groups of workers (row 6) became smaller in absolute terms in the United States but remained relatively constant in Canada. We draw two conclusions from Table 5 :
-Canadian unions have a more equalizing influence on male wages. This pattern stems from two conditions: more men are unionized in Canada, and within the unionized sector Canadian wages are more equalized.
-The equalizing influence of unions has grown larger i n Canada over the period, whereas this influence has diminished i n the United States. Largely accounting for this pattern, again, is the fact that within the union sector, U.S. unions have been less successful over time in maintaining their equalizing influence, while Canadian unions have grown somewhat more successful. The sharp decrease in union density in the United States has also played a role.
The Contribution of Unions and of Minimum Wage Laws to Changes in the Variance of Log Wages
In Table 6 , we decompose relative changes in the variance of log wages into the effect of the minimum wage (column 2) and the effect of unions (column 5 ) . We further decompose the effect of unions into a component attributable to changes in the equalizing effects of unions (column 3) and a component attributable to changes in the unionization rate (column 4) . I 8 The effect of changes in the minimum wage is obtained by contrasting the 1988 actual variance of log wages to the variance that would have prevailed if the minimum wage had remained at its 1981 level (in real I8The contribution of wage equalizing effects of unions is obtained by computing the effect of unions on the variance of log wages in 1981 and 1988 that would have prevailed if the unionization rate had remained constant over this period. The effect of changes in the unionization rate is obtained by doing just the opposite (holding equalizing effects constant but changing the unionization rate). terms). This hypothetical variance is obtained by using the imputation procedure described at the end of Appendix 2.
The key results in Table 6 can be summarized as follows:
-In the absence of unions, the variance of log wages would have increased by 9.6% less in the United States than it actually did. Most of this effect is attributable to the decline in unionization as opposed to changes in the equalizing effects of unions. This effect is also smaller than those found by Card (1992) and , who used data for longer time periods than 1981-88.
-In the absence of unions, the variance of log wages would have increased by 101 % more in Canada than it actually did. Contrary to the case in the United States, this effect is almost solely due to the fact that Canadian unions became relatively "more equalizing" in 1988 than in 1981.
-The decline in the minimum wage in the United States accounted for 22% of the increase in the variance of log wages from 1981 to 1988. This finding is consistent with the semiparametric evidence reported in Figure l a This last finding points to the large, though neglected, role of labor market institutions in explaining the very different changes in wage inequality across countries. It is interesting to note that Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower (1995) conjectured that unions and minimum wage legislation played a major role in explaining the very different experiences of France and the United Kingdom with regard to changes in inequality over the 1980s. By comparing Canada and the United States, we have been able to directly test these Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the effect on the variance of wages as a percentage of total changes in the variance. The effect of the minimum wage is computed by comparing actual changes in the variance of wages to changes that would have prevailed if the distribution of wages at or below the 1981 real minimum wage in 1988 was as in 1981. The total effect of unions 011changes in the variance of wages (column 5) is calculated using the estimated effect of unions reported in Table 5 (columns 3 and 6 of row 8 ) . Columns (3) and (4) show this total union effect decomposed into the impact of changes in the effect of unions on the variance of wages, holding constant unionization rates (column 3), and changes in the unionization rates, holding constant the effect of unions on the variance of wages (column 4 differential Canada/C.S. changes in age noting that the two studies focus on differand education differentials. Explanations ent measures of inequality. Freeman and for these changes must thus be found elseNeedels (1993) focused on the evolution of where. On the other hand, institutional t h e college-high school differential, factors explain more systematically the evowhereas we look at more global measures of lution of within-group (row 3.e) and overwage dispersion (entire distribution and all wage inequality.
variance of log wages). Table 4 for a description of the samples and of the measures of wage inequality used.
and Needels (1993) on the role of supply shocks in the evolution of education wage differentials can be perfectly consistentwith our general conclusion that institutions explain most of the Canada/LT.S. differences in changes in wage inequality. Education wage differentials are one important dimension of wage inequality but not the only one. O u r findings do not suggest that factors like supply and demand do not explain any of the difference between the United States and Canada. They simply suggest that these factors play a small role compared to the one played by institutions when broadly defined measures of wage inequality are considered.
Conclusion
In the 1980s wage inequality grew larger in the United States while it remained roughly constant in Canada. Returns to education increased much faster in the United States than in Canada. but returns to experience increased more in Canada than in the United States. During the same period, unionization rates fell precipitously in the United States but declined verv little in Canada. Similarly, the real minimum wage declined by 23% in the United States but by only 12% in Canada.
using large computerized data files for men in the United States and Canada in 1981 and 1988, we have found that unions and the minimum wage accounted for two-thirds of the differential growth " of wage inequality between the two countries. These results suggest that labor market institutions are an i m~o r t a n t explanation for the difference in the evolution of overall wage inequality in the two countries.
Appendix 1 Canadian Data
In this Appendix, we describe how the Canadian samples were edited to make them comparable to the U.S. samples. For each month of the year (each week in 1988) we knowwhether the individual was working OII each job. M7e determined which job (if any) was the mainjob by comparing usual hours of work on the differentjobs. Once it was established that a job was a main job during a month, a weight of 1/12 was assigned to thisjob. The weight was augmented by 1/ 12 for each additional month in which the job was determined to be a main job. Our final sample is thus a sample of jobs, and not a sample of individuals.
M7hen weighted using the above procedure, however, this sample of jobs becomes equivalent to a sample of main jobs that would be obtained at a given point of time. This "weighted sample" is thus comparable to the sample obtained in the CPS. O n e feature of both our reweighted Canadian sample and the CPS sample is that shortjobs tend to be undersampled relative to an annual sample ofjobs. O u r measures of the distribution of earnings will thus tend to p u t "less weight" on people weakly attached to the labor force than measures based on annual earnings.
Appendix 2

Semi-parametric Estimates of the Effects of Unions on the Minimum Wage
In this a p p e n d i x we describe briefly o u r semiparametric density estimation method. Full details can be found in DFL.
Let w refer to wages, x to characteristics other than union status. The definition of conditional probability yields the following representation of the overall distribution of wages. First consider the effect of unions. It is useful to define two other densities. First, the observed density of wages in the nonunion sector is given by (11) f(zulu = 0) = /f"(rulx)f(xlu = 0) dx, where f"(rulx) I f(wlx,u= 0 ) . Likewise, the observed density of wages in the union sector is given by where f"(wlx) af(wlx,u = 1). By analogy to the Oaxaca decomposition, we are interested in what distribution would prevail if all workers (not just nonunion workers) were paid under the wage structure in the nonudion sector, or, more formally:
This equation is similar to equation (11) except that we integrate over the distribution of characteristics x for all workers ( f ( x ) ) instead of nonunion workers only Cf(xlu = 0 ) ) . Estimation of the above density can be made simple by noting that Bayes' Law implies By substituting (14) into (13) we get where 0(x) = P r ( u = 0) / P r ( u = Olx). Notice that equation (16) is identical to equation ( 1 1) except for the weighting factor 8(x), which is estimated by noting that P r ( u = 0) is merely the proportion of nonunion members in the sample, while P r ( u = 01x) can be estimated by adiscrete choice model like a Probit.lY The weighting factors used in this paper were calculated using conventional "human capital" covariates entered in a fairly unrestricted way in a probit model. Kernel density estimation with weights O2= 8(xg)i5 a straightforward modification of the usual RosenblattParzen Density estimator Finally, note that our estimates were not sensitive to choice of reasonable variations in bandwidth or kernel.
lgPr(u=Olx) can also be estimated nonparametrically by dividing u p the sample by the characteristics x and calculating the proportion of individuals in each cell.
In the case of the minimum wage, a similar procedure can be used under the assumption that minimum wages have no spillover or employment effects, and that the shape of the wage distribution at or below the minimum wage does not depend on its level (see DFL for more details). Consider what would happen to the 1988 wage distribution if the minimum wage were raised to its higher 1981 level. Under the three above assumptions, a simulated distribution is obtained by replacing the 1988 observations at or below the real 1981 minimum wage by the corresponding 1981 observatiolls weighted by the factor
